INTRODUCTION
Forty years ago, civil rights activists across the country rejoiced in the passing of the Voting Rights Act 1 ("VRA" or "the Act"). The Act was a crowning achievement of the classical civil rights movement and the culmination of a bloody series of events seeking political empowerment for African-Americans in the United States.
Two primary provisions of the Act are set to expire in 2007, under the watch of one of the most conservative federal governments in our country's history. It is already apparent that civil rights groups and activists must convene a broad coalition from both ends of the political spectrum to ensure that this historic legislation is preserved and the expiring provisions renewed. This article will attempt to identify and discuss the most contentious issues that can be expected to surround the reauthorization of one provision of the Act: Section 5. It will also suggest solutions for the kinds of academic and legislative strategies that could help resolve some of these tensions in an effort to promote a unified reauthorization effort.
Congress has amended the VRA several times since 1965, 2 and in 1982 and 1992, respectively, set 2007 as an expiration date for two critical provisions: Sections 5 and 203.
3 Section 5, when it was enacted in 1965, was designed as a remedial device aimed at areas with a documented history of discrimination against voters of color. Those areas, which currently include
The third dominant provision of the VRA, Section 2, is permanent and applies to the entire country. Under Section 2, a private party or the Justice Department can bring a suit to challenge any existing voting practice or apportionment scheme that "results in a denial or abridgment" of the right to vote on the basis of race, color, or language-minority status.
12 Thus, instead of measuring the impact that a new voting practice will have on existing minority voting strength as required under the retrogression test of Section 5, Section 2 claims require a court to evaluate the presence or extent of racial vote dilution in a current election procedure. This involves applying a "totality of the circumstances" approach, or examining the overall context of the election systems to determine whether the challenged election law causes minority voters to have "less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice." 13 Additionally, in the context of redistricting schemes challenged under Section 2, the courts have developed three prima facie factors that must be satisfied before a court can determine whether, under a totality of the circumstances, a Section 2 violation has occurred. These preconditions are: (1) the minority group is "sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority" in a single-member district; (2) the minority group is politically cohesive; and (3) the white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it usually to defeat the minority-preferred candidate. conditions are met, the Court has sometimes ordered the creation of majorityminority districts to "ensure equal political and electoral opportunity" to minority voters. 15 As the 2007 reauthorization deadline approaches, the time is ripe to begin examining the issues surrounding the renewal of Sections 5 and 203-that is, whether they should be renewed and, if so, how they can be amended and strengthened. The foregoing discussion will attempt to provide an overview of the debates over whether to renew and how to strengthen Section 5, and the arguments that can be anticipated on either side. In particular, it will address two levels of debate surrounding the reauthorization of Section 5. It will first delve into the general arguments and concerns surrounding the reauthorization of Section 5, touching on potential federalism or states' rights issues and concerns held by many, including U.S. Supreme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy, over its constitutionality. It will then discuss the issues of contention among those who believe in the reauthorization, but differ over what a reauthorized Section 5 should look like. This discussion will also offer specific suggestions for further research that can potentially resolve some of those contentions.
The first level of debate, discussed in Part II, details concerns among a broader community of interested legislators, election law specialists and attorneys who question the general need for reauthorizing Section 5. 16 These arguments entail questions of whether sufficient discrimination remains to justify such a broad intrusion into a state or local jurisdiction's election law and procedural decisions. These critiques have been bolstered by current Supreme Court jurisprudence mandating that legislation passed in furtherance of the Equal Protection Clause be "congruent and proportional" to the remedy it is seeking to address. 17 In other words, the Supreme Court has said that Congress can only enact laws like Section 5, aimed at preventing violations of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, if the federal intrusion into state lawmaking is just enough to prevent the recurrence of specific discriminatory acts and enable the remedy of previous ones.
Part III will cover the second level of debate surrounding the renewal of Section 5, which assumes agreement that this provision is still relevant and necessary to prevent the enactment of electoral procedures and structures that harm the influence of minority voters. It will discuss current contentions among voting rights advocates and academics who collectively support the reauthorization of Section 5 but disagree on what form the renewed Section 5 should take. These issues specifically deal with clarifying which election laws and apportionment plans should pass preclearance and which should be rejected. Among other things, there are questions over whether apportionment plans that eliminate majority-minority districts should be deemed retrogressive (current case law suggests not 18 ) and whether election laws and districting that violate Section 2 should be pre-cleared under Section 5 (current case law suggests that violations of Section 2 are not enough to require rejection of a plan or proposed change under Section 5 19 ). The paper will conclude with a few recommendations for further research that can illuminate answers to these and other questions leading up to the reauthorization.
Prior to expanding on both of these debates, however, it is important to detail the development of the current legal and political application of Section 5. The first section will offer an overview of the legislative development and case law surrounding Section 5.
I. A Brief Overview of the Legal and Political History of Section 5
When Section 5 was enacted along with the VRA in 1965, it was not seen as one of the Act's most important-or controversial-provisions. 20 Its original purpose was to prevent state legislatures from enacting a continuous stream of discriminatory voting plans without giving minority plaintiffs an opportunity to challenge those plans through the legal system. 21 The actual terms in the legislation and the Congressional Record illustrate a great deal of ambiguity over how Section 5 was intended to be implemented and how 23. Id. at 345-46 ("During most of the debate the discussion centered upon eliminating these barriers to Black registration. Given the low registration numbers of Blacks, the 1965 Voting Rights Act was originally and primarily aimed at eliminating obstacles to Black registration, such as literacy tests, good character tests, the practice of purging Blacks from the voting rolls once they were registered, and poll taxes. With all of these impediments to Black registration in place, Southern legislatures had never before needed to resort to schemes aimed at diluting the Black vote; there was, quite simply, no significant Black vote to dilute.").
24. Id. at 346 ("In the few times that Section 5 is mentioned during the [1965 House] congressional hearings and Congressional Record, there is a great deal of ambiguity and conflicting testimony regarding its intended purview."); id. at 352 ("Section 5 was mentioned even less during the Senate hearings than in the House hearings."). See also id. at 352 n.64 ("As was the case with the House Hearings, the majority of the discussion in the Senate focused on the constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act, as well as its major and more controversial provisions. As with the House hearings, when Section 5 was mentioned, often times only a mere repetition of the wording of the Act itself was given, which is of little evidentiary value.").
See Laughlin McDonald, The 1982 Extension of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965:
The Continued Need for Preclearance, 51 TENN. L. REV. 1, 63 (1983) (noting also that this amendment failed because Congress "concluded that the Attorney General already had such authority under Section 2 and refused to abandon Section 5 in favor of a return to the ineffective case-by-case method of enforcing voting rights").
26. The added jurisdictions were: Kings and Bronx Counties in New York; Elmore County, Idaho; election districts in Alaska; counties in Arizona, California, and Wyoming; and towns in Connecticut, New Hampshire, Maine, and Massachusetts. S. REP. NO. 94-295, at 13 (1975) .
violations were to be determined by the Department of Justice. 22 Indeed, because at the time most of the discussion was about barriers to the registration of Black voters, state legislatures did not have any significant Black vote to dilute or gerrymander. 23 Thus, based in part on the context of the times, there is little in the 1965 Congressional Record that discusses which election laws, procedures, and apportionment plans should be rejected under the preclearance provision.
24
Section 5 was up for reauthorization five years later, in 1970. This first reauthorization occurred under the watch of a hostile White House. The Nixon Administration was pushing for the Section to be repealed, and thenAttorney General John Mitchell sought to replace Section 5 with language authorizing the Department of Justice to initiate a suit anywhere in the country against a discriminatory voting practice.
25
Despite these attempts, a Democratic-controlled Congress rejected all attempts to repeal or weaken Section 5, and instead reauthorized it for five additional years. Congress also increased the number of jurisdictions subject to preclearance 26 reviews of the "effects" of electoral changes. Specifically, the Court held that a covered jurisdiction was not obligated to maximize the political strength of minority voters, but only "to insure that no voting procedure changes would be made that would lead to a retrogression in the position of racial minorities with respect to their effective exercise of the electoral franchise." 35 Thus, any electoral change that led to a decrease in the minority's "effective exercise" of its voting strength would be held to violate the VRA. In Beer, the Court upheld the legality of a redistricting plan that slightly improved the chances of minority voters electing their candidate of choice over the previous plan, even though it did not maximize, or even significantly improve, those chances.
36
The "non-retrogression" holding in Beer was a significant move away from the Court's previously broad interpretations of the VRA. Scholars have called it "the foot in the door for the Rehnquist Court's color-blind jurisprudence and the subsequent death of minority voting rights" 37 and a "bittersweet decision for minority voters."
38 But while the Beer decision focused on the minimal requirements that a jurisdiction must adhere to in order to comply with Section 5, a case decided the following year represented a higher point of the Court's interpretation of the VRA. In United Jewish Organizations, Inc. v. Carey 39 ("UJO"), the Court held that the Constitution did not prevent a jurisdiction that was covered by Section 5 from deliberately creating or maintaining minority-majority districts in order to insure that a reapportionment plan satisfies the Section, particularly when the jurisdiction was attempting to eradicate the effects of past discrimination. 40 Congress strengthened the protections of Section 5 again in 1982 by extending it another twenty-five years, setting it to expire in 2007. 41 That year, Congress also established a new scheme for bailout from Section 5 coverage designed to encourage jurisdictions to change their voting practices 2005 and thereby eliminate barriers to minority political participation. A jurisdiction could "bailout" of the preclearance requirements by seeking a declaratory judgment from a three-judge panel of the District Court of the District of Columbia, showing it had met the bailout requirements for a tenyear period. 42 These bailout requirements include: (1) full compliance with the preclearance requirements; (2) a demonstration that no test or device had been used to discriminate on the basis of race, color, or language; (3) a showing that no actions alleging voting discrimination are pending. 43 Following the 1982 amendments, the Justice Department took an aggressive stance in enforcing Section 5, leading to the adoption of a record number of majority-minority districts in covered areas where over 50% of the voting age population was a member of a racial minority group. 44 This led to a reaction from the courts, and an amalgamation of cases that together greatly weakened the strength of Section 5's preclearance "shield. The Court did not overrule its previous jurisprudence; however, the opinion noted that districts that are bizarrely shaped and non-compact, or that otherwise neglect traditional districting principles and deviate substantially from the hypothetical courtdrawn district for predominantly racial reasons, will still be deemed unconstitutional.
53
This redistricting conundrum was further complicated by the two landmark decisions in Reno v. Bossier Parish School Board. 54 In 1997, the Court held in Bossier Parish I that preclearance may not be denied solely on the basis that the election change would violate Section 2 of the VRA. 55 The Court held that evidence that a change would violate Section 2 may be relevant to prove that a covered jurisdiction had retrogressive intent in enacting a redistricting plan or other electoral change with a discriminatory purpose, but emphasized that "the link between dilutive impact and intent to retrogress is far from direct."
56 Two years later, in Bossier Parish II, the Court held that a redistricting plan with a "discriminatory but nonretrogressive" purpose would not violate Section 5.
57
In other words, a proposed voting change that, despite evidence of purposeful discrimination, still manages to improve or maintain the status quo with respect to the electoral influence of minority voters would be permissible. In Bossier Parish II, this meant specifically that a jurisdiction where 20% of its voters were black, with a decades-long history of resistance to school desegregation orders, was not required to draw any majority-black districts for its school board.
58 Section 5, the Court interpreted, "prevents nothing but backsliding, and preclearance under [ 2000) (warning that "the holding of Bossier Parish II entrenches the status quo and effectively reads the purpose prong out of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. In the future, this case will place the burden upon challengers of preclearance to prove retrogression or to use avenues other than Section 5 to make a claim that a redistricting plan is discriminatory. Armed with the circumscribed reading of purpose in Bossier Parish II, jurisdictions will probably look to the District of Columbia District Court for vindication, making it easier for covered jurisdictions to bound over the one-time nearly insurmountable hurdle of Section 5."); J. Gerald Hebert, Redistricting in the Post-2000 Era, 8 GEO. MASON L. REV. 431, 444 (2000) (concluding that "redistricting plans enacted with an unconstitutional, racially discriminatory but non-retrogressive purpose will now receive preclearance from the DOJ and then be subject to immediate challenge in the courts. This result is plainly at odds with the prophylactic purposes of section 5, which Congress intended to place the burdens of time and inertia on the shoulders of the perpetrators of discrimination rather than the victims.").
62 reduce the minority voting age population in some majority-minority districts "even if it means that in some of those districts, minority voters will face a somewhat reduced opportunity to elect a candidate of their choice." 65 Georgia's plan "unpacked" many of the state's majority-minority legislative districts and replaced them with a number of influence districts. 66 Yet, although the new plan reduced the overall number of majority-minority districts, the Court found that the Georgia State Senate plan did not "lead to a retrogression in the position of racial minorities with respect to their effective exercise of the electoral franchise" because it created more majorityDemocrat districts.
67 Based on the reasoning that an elected Democrat was more likely to represent the interests of black voters than a Republican, regardless of her race or the demographics of her supporters, the Court reasoned that the legislature's intent in drawing these district lines to create majority-Democrat districts protected the interests of black voters in Georgia. 68 The Court's opinion emphasized that "a substantial majority of black voters in Georgia" are registered Democrats and noted that numerous African-American elected officials in Georgia-all of whom were Democrats-supported the challenged plan.
69
The Supreme Court's opinion in Georgia dramatically weakened the strength of Section 5 by essentially increasing the types of redistricting changes that are permissibly non-retrogressive. Whereas previous opinions by the Court had described Section 5 as a federal protection against state and local efforts to diminish the ability of communities of color to elect 70 representatives of their choice, 70 the Court's holding in Georgia departed from that precedent and promoted greater deference to the covered jurisdictions, despite the fact that those jurisdictions are covered by Section 5 precisely because they have previously instituted policies that weakened the electoral power of minority voters. Under the new standard, a court's federal review must look only at whether, in enacting a new districting plan, (1) the local jurisdiction tried to protect the "ability of minority voters to elect their candidate of choice," (2) whether the minority group currently has an opportunity to participate in the political process, and (3) whether local minority officeholders supported the plan.
71
If the federal evaluator determines that officials in the covered jurisdiction met these requirements, the plan is permissible under Section 5, even if the plan leads to an overall reduction in the election of minority candidates of choice.
Georgia caps the convoluted evolution of the Court's interpretation of Section 5 as it approaches its 2007 expiration. While some contend that Congress and advocates can take advantage of the upcoming reauthorization deadline to push for a strengthened version of the provision, 72 others argue that constitutional concerns and a general decrease in discrimination in the covered areas indicate that the Section is no longer needed and should be allowed to expire. Thus, before launching into a discussion of the ways Section 5 can be improved in light of today's political climate and Supreme Court jurisprudence, it is important to discuss whether the Section should be reauthorized at all.
II. General Debates Around Whether to Renew Section 5
There are three predominant issues raised by academics and others who believe that Section 5 ought to be retired in 2007. First is the constitutional issue-that is, whether Section 5 is still a constitutionally permissible remedy for past electoral discrimination. The second is a related but more general "states' rights" argument as to whether the federal intrusion created by the Section 5 preclearance requirements is still warranted given that even voting rights heroes like Congressman John Lewis have testified that some covered areas are no longer rife with electoral barriers. 73 Section 5 conflicts with Section 2, making for a confusing VRA where electoral changes could pass muster under one section but be struck down under another. 74 Proponents of this argument generally believe that Section 2 alone is sufficient for protecting against discriminatory election laws and districting, and that as such, Section 5 should be allowed to expire.
A. The Constitutional Issue
The most significant hurdle facing Section 5's reauthorization is whether its extension would be constitutional under the Supreme Court's current interpretation of Congressional power to pass legislation in furtherance of the Fourteenth Amendment. 75 In 1997, the Supreme Court radically revised its Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence when it struck down the Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA") in City of Boerne v. Flores. 76 The Court in Boerne held that, while Congress has the power to "enforce" the Fourteenth Amendment with appropriate legislation, Congress did not have "the power to decree the substance of the Fourteenth Amendment's restrictions on the States."
77 Instead, it is the Court's role to interpret the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment and Congress's role to enact legislation in furtherance of that interpreted scope. While the Constitution gave Congress the "remedial" power to enforce existing constitutional provisions, it barred the passage of legislation that altered the meaning of those provisions.
78
And with any remedial legislation, the Court declared, there must be "congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end." 79 Thus, the RFRA was struck down because it went beyond these powers, as it was enacted to combat religious bigotry despite the 2005 fact that, in the legislative record, there was no evidence of religious persecution "occurring in the past 40 years."
80
Boerne was followed by a series of decisions expanding on the congruence and proportionality test, each of which further narrowed congressional enforcement capacity under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. 81 However, in 2003, the Court moved slightly away from this trend in Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs. 82 In Hibbs, the Court upheld a provision of the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA") that permitted state employees to sue the state for violations of the Act's family leave provision. 83 While reiterating the limits on Congress to substantially redefine the substance of the Fourteenth Amendment, stating that "[t]here must be a congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented and remedied and the means adopted to that end," the Hibbs decision gave Congress wide latitude to delineate the line between substance and remedy. 84 Despite the opinion in Hibbs, the precedent established under Boerne has doomed various pieces of civil rights legislation, 85 and many, including Justice Kennedy, 86 have speculated that a reauthorized Section 5 would meet a similar fate.
87
On one hand, Section 5 has withstood previous constitutional challenges, 88 and the opinion in Boerne even refers to Section 5 as a permissible extension of Congress's enforcement power. 89 94. Winke, supra note 92, at 119. In those cases where racial bloc voting is severe enough to consistently deny minorities the opportunity to elect representatives of their choice, the acquiescence of election officials in such a process amounts to a form of racial discrimination. While such discrimination may not be intentional in every case, it is reasonable to surmise that inaction or grudging action in the face of racial bloc voting must, in many circumstances, be the result of intentional, and hence unconstitutional, discrimination.
recently held specifically in Lopez v. Monterey County that "the Voting Rights Act, by its nature, intrudes on state sovereignty. The Fifteenth Amendment permits this intrusion. . . ."
90
It does not automatically follow, however, that a reauthorized Section 5 could withstand similar challenges today. Some have argued that the provision has only been upheld thus far because of its sunset clause and that reauthorizing it could render that justification irrelevant. 91 Without proof of significant efforts to harm the electoral strength of minority voters, and absent evidence that covered areas are continuing to discriminate based on race or national origin, there is a fear that certain Supreme Court Justices would not believe there is a continued need for the preclearance requirements.
92
To that end, various prominent voting rights scholars have stressed the necessity of building a record of evidence of ongoing racial discrimination in covered jurisdictions. 93 Such a record could ensure the survival of a renewed Section 5 in the face of a Boerne challenge. Further investigation is needed to determine just how much evidence could be sufficient, particularly with the gradual decline in overt racial discrimination in covered areas. One suggestion is for advocates to present Congress with evidence of racial bloc voting to "function as a proxy for intentional discrimination in some circumstances." 94 In support of this, one scholar has argued that, overall, Pamela Karlan has suggested that the Supreme Court's opinion in Boerne can be interpreted to permit legislation that seeks to provide a remedy for three types of discrimination: internal, external, and prospective. 96 Evidence of internal discrimination involves a showing of voting practices that are blatantly administered in an intentionally discriminatory manner, such as literacy tests and poll taxes. 97 Evidence of external discrimination involves the presence of election procedures and apportionment plans that are facially neutral but have a disparate, harmful impact on minority voters. 98 Prospective discrimination evidence includes examples of current voting practices that could lead to future discrimination to minority voters, such as attempts to pass redistricting plans that exclude or harm the electoral power of minority voters.
99 By including evidence of these three types of discrimination in the legislative record, Karlan argues a renewed Section 5 should withstand constitutional scrutiny. 100 In addition to evidentiary considerations like Karlan's, the civil rights world must focus on developing legislative strategies to combat potential constitutionality pitfalls. Victor Rodriguez, an attorney with the Mexican American Legal Defense Fund ("MALDEF"), has cogently presented three of the most prominently discussed legislative strategies: (1) maintaining the temporary nature of the provision by limiting its renewal to under twenty-five years; 101 (2) weakening the bailout provision to make it easier for jurisdictions 142 UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67:125 distinguishing Section 5 from disapproved statutes. The length of the reauthorization period may also be a significant factor. . . .
[T]he first three reauthorization periods were relatively short (1965-1970, 1970-1975, and 1975-1982) while the most recent reauthorization was for twenty-five years."). 102. Id. at 806. 103. Id. at 805-06. 104. Id. at 803 ("Federalism concerns will undoubtedly drive most of the opposition to the Act's extension."); see also Winke, supra note 92, at 85 ("Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act represents the most powerful intrusion into state and local sovereignty of the civil rights legislation passed in the postwar period.").
to opt out of coverage; 102 and (3) reducing the number of areas covered under Section 5 to those jurisdictions that were only recently denied preclearance. 103 While the first of these is reasonable given the importance the Supreme Court grants to Section 5's sunset clause in Boerne, the strategy of pushing for a temporary Section 5 can hardly be considered sufficient to overcome the evidentiary concerns facing the reauthorization. The second suggestion, weakening the opt-out provision, would also not stand on its own to promote reauthorization without accompanying evidence of current continuing discrimination in jurisdictions that would remain covered.
The final suggestion does address that issue, but does so at the risk of weakening the overall strength of the provision and the VRA. If Congress were to reduce the number of areas covered by Section 5 to only those that have proposed electoral changes that violated the preclearance provision in the past twenty years, the VRA protections would fall victim to the tenuous assumption that a jurisdiction that has not proposed any retrogressive electoral changes in the past twenty years, but had in the past twenty-five, would not do so in the future.
If, however, any of these strategies are coupled with an effort to present evidence of discriminatory electoral practices in other areas, they could present potential bargaining concessions if the debate remains strictly focused on whether to reauthorize the provision. Still, it is worth emphasizing that they should not be considered a "starting point" for a legislative strategy employed by advocates wishing to remain focused on reauthorizing a strong and effective Section 5.
B. The Federalism Issue
Beyond the constitutional issues lie deeper federalism and states' rights concerns about the intrusion of federal anti-discrimination review standards on state or local election procedures. 104 agrees that such an imposition violates the Constitution, 105 critics argue that Section 5's preclearance requirement imposes substantial and even unnecessary federalism costs on covered jurisdictions seeking to, in many cases, merely draw their own district lines or enact certain election procedures. 106 Of specific concern is that federal enforcement of Section 5 preempts jurisdictions from enacting their own voting changes and apportionment plans, instead requiring that they receive approval from the U.S. Department of Justice ("DOJ") or a federal court in Washington, DC. A secondary and related concern is that the jurisdictions must then bear the burden of proving that any proposed change does not discriminate against minority voters, instead of placing that burden on the federal government.
These federalism concerns were highlighted in recent court opinions. In Lopez v. Monterey County, 107 the U.S. Supreme Court was asked whether Monterey County, a California county covered by Section 5, was required to preclear an election change imposed by the California state government, when the state as a whole was not covered by Section 5. The Court held that a covered jurisdiction within a non-covered state must still obtain preclearance for any election change in state law. 108 While academics have argued that the Lopez decision essentially "settled" the federalism issue, they emphasize that "there is considerable tension below the surface" of the debate.
109
This tension was illustrated in a recent concurring opinion written in a separate case by a federal court judge in Alabama. Acknowledging that precedent dictated Section 5's constitutionality, Judge DeMent's opinion grumbled that preclearance requires "states to grovel at the feet of the Attorney General or the District Court for the District of Columbia." 110 There are two primary reasons why such "groveling" is a valid and even necessary requirement to impose on the covered jurisdictions and why, accordingly, civil rights advocates should attempt to invalidate these federalism concerns. 113. See Rodriguez, supra note 75, at 803-04 (noting that "most abuses recorded by the DOJ have occurred in precisely those jurisdictions with the worst history of abuse. If an analysis were to focus on just Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Missouri, North and South Carolina, Texas, and Virginia, these eight states (out of the sixteen covered either in part or in whole) would account for 563 out of 599 (almost 94%) of all objections entered by the DOJ to block proposed changes.").
114. See discussion supra part I.A. accompanying note 41 on the 1982 enactment of the bailout provision.
115. See Rodriguez, supra note 75, at 804 (noting that, currently, "each state that is covered either in part or in whole has had at least one objection entered against it since the last reauthorization"); id. at 805 ("There have been relatively few successful bailout suits, however, and this low rate of bailout success indicates that there have been ongoing violations and thus a continued need for Section 5."). coverage is narrowly tailored to apply only to jurisdictions with the most egregious record of discriminatory election practices. 112 An analysis of instances where the DOJ has denied preclearance shows a strong correlation between those denials and a history of previous discrimination.
113 Second, the bailout provision in the VRA allows covered jurisdictions that have been "discrimination-free" for a number of years to be removed from preclearance requirements. 114 This allowance ensures that Section 5 remains continually focused on areas where such oversight has proved necessary to prevent or respond to voting rights abuses.
115

C. The Inconsistency Issue
In addition to the constitutional and states' rights concerns over Section 5, many critics have voiced concern about inconsistencies that haunt the enforcement of Section 5 and Section 2 of the VRA. In particular, scholars note that some plans or election changes that would violate Section 2 might still pass preclearance under Section 5, or changes that are not precleared by the federal government might pass Section 2 scrutiny. This confusion leads some, including Justice Kennedy, 116 to argue that Section 5 should be allowed to expire, permitting Section 2 to be the sole criterion under which the election laws are evaluated. [T]he problem that a state faces in redrawing its congressional districts is this: in order to avoid suits alleging equal protection violations, the state must prove that race was not a predominant factor in sketching district boundaries. For a state to overcome the preclearance hurdle, however, it has to prove that its new plan complies with the section 5 non-retrogression principle, which almost always requires race-conscious districting.
Id.
119 schemes. 118 The Supreme Court's opinion in Shaw v. Reno 119 explicitly barred state and local governments from using race as a predominant factor in their districting efforts. 120 Many jurisdictions, however, find that they must use race as a consideration if their redistricting plans are to comply with Section 5. As a result, critics argue, Section 5 pushes covered jurisdictions to take race into consideration when changing election procedures or redistricting, while the Equal Protection Clause prohibits race from being a predominant factor.
121
A great deal of confusion has been created by these perceived conflicts.
122
As leading voting rights scholar Pamela Karlan summarizes, "[s]tates now find themselves walking a tightrope: if they draw majority-black districts they face lawsuits under the equal protection clause; if they do not, they face both objections under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act and lawsuits under Section 2."
123 Other scholars, however, have argued that this is not the case, and that compliance with Section 5 in particular does not require that race be considered, arguing in opposition that "Section 5 forbids covered jurisdictions to consider race in redistricting decisions even when in compliance with the non-retrogression principle." 126. See Errickson, supra note 36, at 2069 ("Section 5 protects minority voters from the necessity of bringing suit against the state for enacting a more discriminatory districting plan than the one currently in use by blocking the proposed plan from ever taking effect. By contrast, section 2 provides protection against plans that are objectively, rather than comparatively, discriminatory.").
127. This contention leads some to argue the protections against vote dilution in the Equal Protection Clause and Section 2 are sufficient for protecting minority electoral strength and participation. 125 In essence, supporters of this argument believe that Section 2 vote dilution claims are sufficient at reaching discriminatory election laws and procedures. Such a viewpoint, of course, ignores the idea that Section 5 and Section 2 are designed to reach two different types of discriminatory election systems; Section 5 looks at plans as compared with the previous status of minority voters in the area, while Section 2 looks at plans from an objective standpoint.
126
There are a few solutions that would allow Section 5 to be renewed while resolving some of the inconsistency concerns. Some scholars have argued, for example, that the retrogression standard of Section 5 should be replaced with the vote dilution standard of Section 2.
127
This would mean that, under Section 5, only election changes that would result or are intended to result in vote dilution would be denied preclearance. 128 Others have proposed altering the constitutionality test established in Shaw v. Reno, allowing a "presumption of constitutionality in favor of districts drawn from precincts or tracts where the supposedly favored racial group does not have a controlling electoral majority."
129 Another idea, aimed specifically at resolving the redistricting confusion, involves requiring Congress to articulate, in legislation, an explicit list of traditional redistricting principles.
130 Suggestions such as these should be part of the reauthorization debate or explored as potential compromises to put forth if the inconsistency issue becomes a major roadblock.
D. The Symbolic Issue
Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, arguments surrounding the expiration of Section 5 must acknowledge the overall symbolic significance 2005 132 Allowing Section 5 to expire would send a signal that Congress is no longer committed to protecting minority voters from continued efforts to dilute their electoral strength. Therefore, it is important that any effort geared towards pushing for reauthorization includes specific reference to the subtle but real symbol of the continued presence of Section 5 protections.
Various studies have linked an increase in minority participation, representation, and empowerment to the symbolic protections of Section 5. Other academics have emphasized that there continues to be a general importance of increasing and maintaining racial diversity among elected officials representing an increasingly diverse electorate, and cite Section 5 as critical to enabling that diversity. 135 Subtle but important benefits of such diversity include a "greater stability in society due to an enhanced sense of ] t a time when voter cynicism and apathy drives voter participation rates to new lows with each election and when there is a retrenchment of conservative politics that many perceive as anti-minority, there is a need for a symbolic and substantive commitment on the part of government to protecting the right to vote for people of color.").
138. Suggested in a letter from Bernard Grofman, Professor of Political Science, University of California, Irvine, to Barbara Arnwine, Executive Director, Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law (Mar. 24, 2004) (on file with author).
139. Rodriguez, supra note 75, at 810. As minorities move into new communities in different parts of the country, there will almost certainly be friction not only between Whites and Latinas/os but also between established communities of racial minorities and the recently arrived minority group, who represents new electoral "competition." This competition and perception of a zero-sum game will increase the likelihood that established communities (White and non-White) may resort to finding ways to maintain their power and to prevent the newcomers from the full enjoyment of their voting rights. Section 5's original framework may need to be reconceptualized in this multiethnic context.
Id.
shared interests and inclusion" and "improved economic efficiency because fewer resources are lost to internal unrest and distrust." 136 Section 5 is a message that the federal government sends to minority voters, in jurisdictions that have been hostile to their interests and rights, promising that those localities will never again be permitted to enact barriers that hinder the electoral strength of their electorate. It is important and vital that efforts to renew Section 5 emphasize the unspoken message of abandonment that Congress would send to both minority voters and the electorate as a whole if they choose not to reauthorize the provision.
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III. A Clarified, Renewed Section 5
While there are real and deep debates over whether to reauthorize Section 5, the resolution of that issue is not the end of the conundrum. Even among civil rights and voting rights advocates and academics who agree that Section 5 must be renewed, there is extensive debate over the form that the renewed version should take. These issues are touched upon briefly in the previous section, but many suggested changes have gone beyond mere suggestions at corrective compromises, at one end arguing for the narrowing of some of the section's provisions, 138 and at the other end arguing for the expansion of the section's protections to adjust to demographic changes. 139 Across this spectrum, suggestions of amendments to Section 5 can be thematically understood as an effort to clarify various terms, currently undefined or defined through Supreme Court case law. The following 2005] PREPARING FOR 2007 149
140. The phrase "ability to elect candidates of choice" typically refers to the power of minority voters, as a bloc, to elect candidates who will effectively represent their interests. See, e.g., Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 46 (1986). discussion will focus on the terms that most need clarification, analyzing the contention around their current vague definitions and interpretations.
A. The Redistricting Conundrum
At the core of many debates surrounding preclearance is whether Section 5 should prohibit or protect certain types of districting changes. Terms like "majority-minority districts," "influence districts," and "coalition districts" are at the center of this debate, as well as questions regarding the effect of such districts on the turnout, electability, and the general representation of minority voters. Many of these disagreements, however, may be resolved by the mere clarification of the definitions of these three types of districts. Whether a district is deemed "majority-minority," "influence," or "coalition" is generally based on the percentage of the minority voting age population within that district, yet these terms have primarily been employed by academics while Congress and the courts remain silent on the specifics of the terms.
But even assuming the districting terms are officially clarified, a more contentious question remains as to whether the enforcement of Section 5 should involve the prohibition or protection of certain types of districts. This feeds into a third, core issue: the effect certain districts have on direct representation of minority voters (through the election of their "candidate of choice" or "descriptive candidate"), and their broader, substantive representation (through the election of candidates who they may not have chosen but who effectively represent their policy interests once elected). This section will attempt to look at each of these issues in turn.
Defining Majority-Minority, Influence, and Coalition Districts
Central to the confusion over the three district definitions are the various views on what specific percentages of minority voters are required to create a "majority-minority" district, where voters of color are virtually guaranteed the election of their candidate of choice. 140 Scholars, courts, the Department of Justice (DOJ), and practitioners have all differed over what precise percentages are required to create such a district, resulting in great confusion over whether a majority-minority district has "packed" too many minority 144. In this case, the percentage of minorities indicated all voters of color in a jurisdiction. 145. Barnes, supra note 143, at 584-85 ("[F]our districts to which the D.O.J. objected were in fact majority-minority districts. This seems to indicate that the D.O.J. does not consider a majority-minority population to be sufficient to protect the minority groups' ability to elect a candidate of their choice. The D.O.J. objection letter requires the electors in the contested districts to have the power to elect the 'candidate of their choice' in order to avoid the determination of a retrogressive effect. . . . [In the opinion of the DOJ] the majority was not 'enough,' and thus the I.R.C. had to pack more minority voters into those four districts, leaving the remaining districts with a disproportionately small number of minority (and often Democrat) voters."). voters into one district and "bleached" other areas, 141 and what is the precise "tipping point," or number of minority voters needed to ensure the election of a minority candidate of choice. A further complication involves questions over what the "majority" percentage should reflect-either the number of voters from one single race or ethnic group, or an aggregate calculation of all the voters of color in a district.
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In 2001, the redistricting commission for the State of Arizona encountered the effects of this confusion head-on; they defined a majorityminority district as one in which 45% or more of the total population were members of any racial minority, while the DOJ considered districts drawn so that at least 55% of the voting age population were members of any racial minority. 143 The contention specifically centered on a difference of opinion as to what percentage of minorities was sufficient to elect the minority candidate of choice. 144 In the eyes of the Arizona Redistricting Commission, its new apportionment plan created ten majority-minority districts, while in the DOJ's eyes, only five were created. Under the DOJ's definition, Arizona's original "benchmark" plan, in place prior to the redistricting, had seven majority-minority districts. Thus, despite the fact that the Arizona Redistricting Commission thought it was actually increasing the number of majority-minority districts in the state, under the DOJ's interpretation it had actually reduced the number of majority-minority districts.
145 Accordingly, the plan was found to be retrogressive and denied preclearance.
This example could be written off as a case of the Arizona Redistricting Commission having a false conception of a majority-minority district, or of the 2005 DOJ doing a poor job in educating covered jurisdictions of the requirements of preclearance. In fact, some commentators have noted that the DOJ's definition is quite nebulous. 146 Regardless of which conclusion one reaches, however, Arizona's difficulties highlight the need for better districting definitions.
The confusion over the proper definition of a "majority-minority district" has also spilled into academia. 147 Like the Arizona example, these debates have primarily involved questions over what percentages of minority voters are required to ensure that the minority candidate of choice is virtually certain to be elected. But, the academic debates also illustrate the importance of resolving the related and similarly vital question: how the percentages of minority voters should be calculated-as a collective group of minority voters or as individual racial or ethnic groups. For example, some consider districts to be majority-minority where Black and Hispanic populations combined comprise 55% of a district's electorate. 148 Others would consider that district not to be a majority-minority district, since neither the Black population on its own, nor the Hispanic population on its own, comprise a majority of the electorate. 149 In one of the most public academic debates over this issue, one study examined districts where the Black electorate was above 50% and concluded that majority-minority districts were no longer necessary to elect minority candidates of choice because Black candidates of choice had been elected in districts where the Black populations were under 50%.
150 Three years later, however, another academic challenged the results by noting that all of the districts in the previous study that had elected This contention is closely related to the difficulties in defining influence and coalition districts. In general terms, these are districts where there are low percentages of minority populations but where, at least in theory, these populations are still large enough to have "influence" over the outcome of an election or to be able to form "coalitions" with other voters in order to exert influence.
152 But even at this vague level, scholars and courts have differed over what precise terms describe either district. Professor Richard H. Pildes, a leading election law commentator, has referred to "coalition districts" as districts where minority voters have a 50-50, but less than certain, chance of electing their candidate of choice. 153 The Supreme Court, however, has referred to this sort of district as an "influence" district. 154 Lower courts have used the term "influence districts" to refer to districts in which minority voters wield so much influence that white officeholders and candidates must be attentive to the concerns of minority voters in order to win and remain in office. 159. Karlan, supra note 63, at 32. 160. This determination is closely linked to the above discussion of which racial proportions best achieve the goals of majority-minority districts. In some cases, districts where the population is, for example, 20% Hispanic and 35% Black, would be majority-minority, but in others they would be termed "influence" or "coalition" districts since the individual racial minority populations are both under 50%.
161. Georgia v. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. at 2498, 2518 (Souter, J., dissenting). Before a State shifts from majority-minority to coalition districts, however, the State bears the burden of proving that nonminority voters will reliably vote along with the minority, . . . . It must show not merely that minority voters in new districts may have some influence, but that minority voters will have effective influence translatable into probable election results comparable to what they enjoyed under the existing district scheme. And to demonstrate this, a State must do more than produce reports of minority voting age percentages; it must show that the probable voting behavior of nonminority voters will make coalitions with minorities a real prospect. 160 And whether this definition is crafted by Congress or the courts, various factors need to be considered. Most importantly, the degree of polarized voting in a district greatly affects the ability of minority voters to exert influence and build cross-racial coalitions, so it is also important that any working definition of these districts considers that issue. 161 Other contextspecific factors, such as racial disparities in registration or turnout rates, have a similar impact on the meaning of minority voters' influence and ability to build coalitions. As Congress works through the reauthorization of Section 5, it should consider whether to clarify these districting terms with ranges of percentages and other factors that, combined, can best predict which types of candidates will be elected and how responsive they will be to minority voters.
Id. (internal citations omitted
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162. For clarity's sake, the remainder of this paper will use the term "majority-minority district" in general terms to refer to districts where minority voters are at least 55% of the voting-age population, with white voters comprising the other 45%. Similarly "influence district" will refer to districts where minority voters comprise 35-50% of the voting-age population, with white voters comprising the balance, and "coalition" district will refer to districts where minority voters are 25-35% of the voting-age population, with white voters making up the other 65-75%. These definitions are based on those now generally employed by the U. CONGRESS (1993) (suggesting that minority districts actually may hurt the careers of individual minority politicians because, although they may win seats in Congress, they fail to gather the broad interracial support required to reach higher office).
164. Pildes, Is Voting-Rights Law Now at War, supra note 153, at 1562. 165. While the definition articulated supra note 140 will be used for the purposes of this paper, the phrase "candidate of choice" is yet another uncertain term in voting rights parlance. Some commentators have suggested ways to clarify this term. See David Epstein & Sharyn O'Halloran, Measuring the Electoral and Policy Impact of Majority-Minority Voting Districts, 43 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 367 (1999) (proposing that a candidate be deemed a "candidate of choice" if (1) in no election was a significant negative correlation observed between black voter turnout and votes for that candidate; AND (2) the candidate must be either a minority candidate or elected from a majority-minority district).
Beyond Clarification: Should Section 5 Protect Majority-Minority Districts?
The above section touches on some of the complications encountered by courts, advocates, and academics arguing over how to define various kinds of districts in a way that accurately reflects the district's effect on minority voting strength. But beyond the discussion on determining specific definitions for majority-minority, influence, and coalition districts, 162 lies an even more contentious debate over whether Section 5 should protect or encourage the preservation of majority-minority districts at the expense of the other two.
For example, some commentators argue that Section 5's historical protection of majority-minority districts in covered jurisdictions has led to a correlative increase in Republican representation in the surrounding "bleached" districts. 163 In this vein, they argue that there is a trade-off involved between the direct representation of minority voters and the broader substantive representation of their interests. 164 Whether there is indeed a "trade-off," however, is far from certain. This section will provide an overview of the empirical evidence surrounding the debate as a way of illustrating the intensity of disagreement over whether Section 5 preclearance should protect majority-minority districts.
The purpose of majority-minority districts is to enable historically disenfranchised and geographically concentrated racial groups to elect their candidates of "choice." 165 The particular need to concentrate minority voters From 1972 to 1992 , the probability of a majority-white congressional district electing a black representative remained at [a] negligible level regardless of a district's median family income, its percentage of high school graduates, the region of the country, or the proportion of residents who were urban, elderly, foreign born, or residents of the relevant state for more than five years . . . every majority black congressional district in the South (out of four) elected a black candidate to office; only one into districts is based on the presence of racially polarized voting in various jurisdictions, particularly those areas covered by Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act.
166 Majority-minority districts were developed in response to these voting patterns as a means of increasing and protecting the political power and representation of minority voters. 167 Most voting rights and election law commentators generally agree that past degrees of racially polarized voting made majority-minority districts necessary to ensure that minority voters had an equal opportunity to elect candidates of their choice. 168 Richard Pildes, now a vocal opponent of majority-minority districts, wrote that when the 1990 redistricting efforts began:
In state and local elections in Georgia during the 1980s, an average of 86% of White voters voted for the White opponent of a Black candidate. In Mississippi, no Blacks were elected to city councils in districts with less than a 50% Black population; indeed, until Black populations in these districts reached at least 65%, Blacks remained dramatically underrepresented. 172. Pildes, Is Voting-Rights Law Now at War, supra note 153, at 1527 ("[B]y 1990, the 65% rule was considered exceptional."). Note that in the same article, however, Pildes also admitted that "districts with 55% black populations were generally sufficient to enable black voters to defeat racial bloc voting, while districts less than 45% black almost never elected black representatives." Id.
173. See, e.g., Cameron et al., supra note 148, at 809 (arguing that requiring a majority of 65% or more "dilutes rather than increases overall minority voting strength").
174. The extent of this partisan alliance is highly debatable. Dissension grew in the early 1990s, however, as some commentators began to question the long-term benefits of majority-minority districts 170 and whether the degree of racially polarized voting was decreasing in such a way as to make the need for "safe" electoral districts irrelevant. 171 In addition, scholars on both sides began to disavow the above-mentioned benchmark of 65% minority voting-age population as being necessary for minority voters to elect their candidates of choice.
172 This opened the door for proponents of influence and coalition districts to begin arguing that concentrating high percentages of minority voters in one district diluted their overall voting strength in the state by "packing" them into single districts.
173
The extension of this argument has partisan implications, since minority voters are traditional supporters of the Democratic Party, and their interests are typically best served by the Democratic Party platform.
174 Thus, some argue that when minority voters are concentrated into majority-minority districts, the support for Democratic candidates in surrounding districts is diminished. Those districts are then "bleached," as the number of white Republican voters correspondingly increases. As a result, notes one commentator, "while majority-minority districting has succeeded in sending 175 . Lisenby, supra note 170, at 657. See also Hench, supra note 37, at 751 ("While creating [majority-minority] districts guarantees a voice for an otherwise excluded community, it may also have a 'ghetto' effect . . . guaranteeing that the remaining white districts will dominate the resulting elected body.").
176 ("The view that Republicans are seeking to use the Voting Rights Act for partisan gain-a view that is accurate-must not be confused with the much stronger claim that the Republicans have actually been able to use the Voting Rights Act in that way. In particular, the assertion that the 1990s has seen partisan manipulation of the DOJ's preclearance and litigation decisions on behalf of the Republican party is largely unsupported.").
record numbers of minorities into Congress, it also has contributed to the success of Republican candidates who often oppose most of the legislative programs that minority groups support." 175 This "tradeoff"-an increase in the direct representation of minority voters at the expense of a decrease in the success of Democratic candidates in surrounding areas-is believed by some to have resulted in the Republican takeover of the House of Representatives in 1994. 176 Specifically, in the redistricting efforts following the 1990 census, thirteen new majority-minority districts were created in the South. 177 In 1992, nine Congressional districts replaced a Democrat with a Republican representative, followed by sixteen others in 1994.
178
This has led some commentators to even suggest collusion between minority representatives and Republican leaders to produce more majorityminority districts at the expense of Democratic districts. 179 184. See, e.g., Grofman & Handley, supra note 44, at n.184 (citing an unpublished study by David Lublin). Lublin concludes that "the creation of new majority-minority districts assured that the Republicans won solid control of the House in 1994." Id. His study focused on seats decided by relatively small margins which lost substantial Black population in the 1990 redistricting efforts, and which shifted to the Republicans by 1994. In particular, he noted "that many of these seats could have remained in Democratic hands if the black population in these districts had been held at their previous levels." Id. 185 (1995) ("In the months since the 1994 election, numerous commentators have blamed redistricting-specifically, the creation of 'majority-minority' districts-for the Republican takeover of Congress. This inaccurate scapegoating of minority voters for Democratic losses is not only wrong, it perniciously undermines support for the Voting Rights Act and the minority representation it has produced."). Others have noted that, with skilled redistricting experts, any perceived tradeoff can be eliminated. See Brace et al., supra note 178, at 183 ("[I]t is sometimes possible . . . to create new black Democratic districts while holding constant . . . the total number of districts held by Democrats of either race. Thus, either because of skillful gerrymandering or because of overwhelming one-party dominance, the concentration of black voting strength in black majority seats may not affect the number of Republican majority seats."). minority districts were attacked by Republican plaintiffs in the early 1990s, but were still precleared by the DOJ. 182 Further, in 1993, seven Republican Congressmen co-sponsored a bill to bar states from creating a district "with the intent to assure that a majority of the voters in that district are people of a particular race or color or language minority." 183 Collusion or not, the correlation of an increase in majority-minority districts in the South and an increase in the election of Republicans to the House of Representatives has led many to argue that there is a causal connection between the two. 184 One commentator claimed that the creation of majority-black districts triggered "the larger collapse of the Democratic Party in the South," providing the Republican party "with the power to dominate national politics and dictate national policy."
185
A result of this blame-game, of course, is that minority voters are used as scapegoats for a phenomenon that was, in part, caused by a failure of the Democratic Party to maintain support in areas where they once had a stronghold. 186 '" 192 Evidence in the LDF report also indicated that if the minority population in northern Mississippi had not been concentrated into one majority-minority district but instead spread between two Democratic districts, the Democratic Party would have likely lost both districts. 193 Reviewing the LDF study, academics have concluded that the "real explanation for the Republican Party takeover of Congress" was the simple result of the fact that "the Republicans organized and got out their vote." 194 The conclusion of these two studies-that Republican gains in the South were the result of a nationwide movement to support the GOP-has been criticized by other studies and commentators. 195 Other studies have presented evidence corroborating these claims. 196 And while it may be impossible to know for certain how the 1994 elections would have gone had majorityminority districts not been created, one thing is clear: without such districts there would have been little to no election of minority candidates of choice in the South.
197
Underlying much of this debate are fundamental questions of what sorts of representation are most beneficial to minority voters. Indeed, the lamentability of any "trade-off"-whether or not it exists-rests on the assumption that Democrats best represent minority interests. It also leads to the question of whether that "substantive" representation is preferable to direct representation of minority voters via their candidates of choice.
The benefits of this direct representation are sometimes overlooked and worth emphasizing here. The presence of a minority voice in a legislature or governing body can have a significant impact beyond mere influence on policy decisions. The presence of that person may change the other members' perceptions about minority group members. Further, in smaller legislative bodies, other members will need to bargain with the minority member to gain her support on certain issues. And in larger bodies, like the U.S. House of Representatives, even a handful of elected minority candidates of choice can vote as a bloc and influence policy decisions-or at the very least will have a bully pulpit to use as a microphone to magnify their voices and the voices of their constituents.
Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, the positive effects of diversifying any governing body can extend beyond any direct effect on policy. It has been suggested, for example, that a minority candidate of choice may have a greater "psychological bond with constituents and will be more sympathetic to the needs of the minority group," making her a more effective representative of the interests of her constituents. 198 Also crucial is the potential inspirational effect her presence may have on encouraging minority group members to participate in the political process, thus reducing group feelings of alienation. Apart from those positive effects on the electorate are the effects such diversity has on the governing body itself. As Judge Leon Higginbotham eloquently stated: "[a] Congress with members of all colors brings more American citizens into the political system . . . it announces that government is for all Americans, increases the confidence of all American voters in the government, and thereby cultivates political participation of all Americans." 199 But other commentators have emphasized the need for broad substantive representation of minority interests and have warned that the election of minority legislators may not advance minority policy initiatives if the Republican Party continues to gain seats in the Congress and in state legislatures. 200 An article by the Harvard Law Review noted that, in the years following the Republican takeover of 1994, "blacks across the country suffered a loss in influence, because the new black representatives found themselves in the minority party in the House, and thus less able to affect national policy. For example, no black representative has chaired a House committee since 1994."
This loss of influence has led some to challenge the presumptive connection between minority interests and Democratic policies. 202 In particular, commentators have suggested that Republicans and AfricanAmericans find a range of issues around which to unite, noting that "[w]hile black legislators have often been liberal on a wide range of issues, there is evidence that the black electorate is conservative on some policies such as abortion. . . . Black officeholders who are economic liberals but social conservatives will find allies on some issues in chambers with Republican majorities." 203 While a partisan realignment could address the issue, others have suggested the abandonment of the federal government's preservation of majority-minority districts in Section 5 jurisdictions as a solution. Instead, interpreting Section 5 to permit the creation of influence or coalition districts in lieu of majority-minority districts in covered jurisdictions could aid Democrats by enabling them to preserve partisan majorities in the influence districts.
This was the argument of the Georgia Democratic Party in Georgia v. Ashcroft. 204 Its apportionment plan, which was upheld by the Court, opted to draw Democratic-majority influence districts where it could have drawn at least one majority-minority district. 205 While the Democrats believed this would preserve their power in the Georgia State Legislature, they actually lost seats in the plan based on a massive grassroots campaign conducted by the Georgia State Republican Party, led by former Christian Coalition Executive Director Ralph Reed. 206 In conjunction with that practical data, academics have also noted that while influence or coalition districts "may appear to be a solution" to any perceived "trade-off between descriptive and substantive representation," they are nowhere close to a panacea. 207 "Even if lines are drawn to ensure the 227. Georgia v. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. 2498, 2518 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("Before a State shifts from majority-minority to coalition districts, however, the State . . . must show not merely that minority voters in new districts may have some influence, but that minority voters will have effective influence translatable into probable election results comparable to what they enjoyed under the existing district scheme. And to demonstrate this, a State must do more than produce reports of minority voting age percentages; it must show that the probable voting behavior of nonminority voters will make coalitions with minorities a real prospect.") (internal citations omitted).
228. See The Future of Majority-Minority Districts, supra note 201, at 2209. 229. For a description of the effect that these regional variations have had on certain electoral changes, see id. at 2218 ("Ten years ago, for example, a federal court in Ohio found that because of the low levels of racially polarized voting in that state, 'black candidates have been repeatedly elected from districts with only a 35% black population.' In contrast, a study of South Carolina elections during roughly the same period found that the black voting age population had to be greater than forty-six percent to ensure blacks an equal opportunity to elect their preferred candidates.") ( 230. Georgia, 123 S. Ct. at 2518 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("Before a State shifts from majorityminority to coalition districts, however, the State bears the burden of proving that nonminority voters will reliably vote along with the minority, . . . It must show not merely that minority voters in new districts may have some influence, but that minority voters will have effective influence translatable into probable election results comparable to what they enjoyed under the existing district scheme. And to demonstrate this, a State must do more than produce reports of minority voting age percentages; it must show that the probable voting behavior of nonminority voters will make coalitions with minorities a real prospect.") (internal citations omitted).
presence of a racially polarized electorate can exacerbate potential problems with certain districting changes. 227 Additionally, while some argue that there has been a decline in racially polarized voting in recent years, 228 what is more certain is that there are regional variations affecting the degree of polarization in a specific area. This indicates that in some areas the presence of high polarization will combine with certain electoral changes to have a retrogressive effect on the minority voters in the jurisdiction, while in other areas the same electoral changes will have a significantly less harmful effect.
229
As such, a requirement that a court consider levels of racial polarization in evaluating changes under Section 5, as it is required to do under Section 2, would help clarify the application of the retrogression standard.
230
The above effects of the muddled retrogression standard are, in part, due to the fact that it is a product of case law, created in Beer and continually molded on an ad-hoc, case-by-case basis. But if Congress were to take responsibility away from the Court and attempt to both formalize and clarify the standard through amendments to Section 5, a second question emerges of what form a clarified retrogression standard should take.
Here again, empirical research could shed light on the best way to define a retrogression standard. Apart from that, Congress-in addition to the 2005 aforementioned example of requiring a court to consider levels of racially polarized voting-could explicitly state what the comparative baseline should be when evaluating retrogression. 231 One commentator has suggested that the courts be required to use proportionality as a retrogression baseline, evaluating a districting plan based on the change in the state's racial demographics, rather than comparing it to the previously enacted legal voting plan. 232 Under this proposal, which would apply specifically to redistricting changes, a state's plan would have to adequately reflect the proportion of minority voters statewide and show that they have potential to be represented in some proportion that would reflect the relative size of their population. 233 The court, similarly, would have to take into account the relative percentage of a jurisdiction's minority population when evaluating a proposed districting plan.
234
There are two drawbacks to this sort of alteration to the retrogression standard. First, it is not clear how requiring proportionality would apply to non-redistricting changes under Section 5, such as changes in polling place locations or election procedures. Second, the U.S. Supreme Court explicitly rejected the idea of proportional representation in Johnson v. De Grandy.
235
Angering the Supreme Court with an amendment to a renewed Section 5 is not a wise political move for Congress to attempt given the Court's present concerns threatening the general constitutionality of Section 5.
Another possibility for clarifying the retrogression standard is for Congress to explicitly list certain changes that would per se be deemed retrogressive. Congress could either list which changes it intends to be deemed retrogressive, or it could list certain evidence that, upon production, would be sufficient for a denial of preclearance.
An example of this would be evidence that a certain districting or election change would likely lead to a decrease in the electoral participation of minority voters. In other words, any change that is likely to lead to a decrease in the turnout or registration rates of minority voters would be per se retrogressive. Proponents of this change would then have the burden of showing that turnout or registration rates are not likely to decrease as a result of the change, perhaps by presenting evidence that enacting the change in similarly situated areas did not produce a decrease in participation rates.
Of course, there are various factors that contribute to the increase or decrease of electoral engagement, and enacting this change could open a host of other uncertainties into litigation, such as how much of a decrease would have to be proven or disproved in order to overcome the presumption of retrogression. But at the same time, some research has shown that certain changes to apportionment plans do lead to a decrease in participation. In particular, some studies indicate that black voter participation increases in districts with high levels of black population, suggesting that moving black voters from majority-minority districts to districts where they comprise a smaller proportion of the population may lead to a decrease in their turnout rates. 236 With further and more definitive research that certain changes are more or less likely to lead to a decrease in the electoral engagement of minority voters, advocates may be able to build a compelling case that Section 5 review should include an explicit requirement to block changes that could harm minority participation.
However, although a Congressional clarification of the retrogression standard may lead to a stronger Section 5, it would also codify the idea of retrogression as the way to evaluate Section 5 claims. 237 While Congress arguably implicitly codified retrogression by choosing not to alter the standard in the more than twenty-five years since the Court created the standard in Beer v. United States, Congress is not barred from writing it out entirely and enacting a new standard for evaluating election changes in covered jurisdictions.
In this vein, some have suggested that replacing the retrogression standard with the vote dilution standard of Section 2 is the optimum way to both address the inconsistency between the two sections and potential constitutional concerns, 238 while also strengthening the preclearance criteria. 158-62 (1984) (noting that incorporating section 2 into section 5 will "return section 5 to its proper role as an agent for the elimination rather than the perpetuation of racial vote dilution"); Way, supra note 127, at 1473 (noting that incorporation of the Section 2 standard into Section 5 is needed to effectuate broad remedial purpose of Voting Rights Act). But see Recent Case, 109 HARV. L. REV. 681, 686 (1996) (noting that incorporation of Section 2 into Section 5 would exacerbate "serious and unwarranted federalism costs" to states). 243. See Way, supra note 127, at 1480-81.
[T]he burden should be on the Justice Department to prove that a submitted plan clearly violates Section 2, rather than on the jurisdiction to prove that plan does not clearly violate Section 2. In the context of a Section 2 suit, it is very difficult for a jurisdiction to prove the negative-that it has not violated Section 2; a presumption of discrimination thus . . . decreases the likelihood that a submitted plan will be found to violate Section 2. Second, once the Justice Department decides that a voting change potentially violates Section 2, the final decision should be made by an Administrative Law Judge in an expedited hearing rather than by the Justice Department. . . . An ALJ would be able to serve as a disinterested party and provide more assurance that a decision will not be based on partisan grounds. The expedited hearing, along with strict evidentiary deadlines, could also potentially reduce some of the delays currently present under Section 5.
Id.
The issue of formal incorporation has been a subject of great debate 240 since the U.S. Supreme Court held in Bossier Parish I 241 that a violation of Section 2 is not a per se violation of Section 5.
242
One commentator has even presented a detailed proposal of how such an incorporation could be structured. 243 There is another potential dilemma that could emerge if Section 2 violations are automatically rejected under Section 5 preclearance evaluations. The political costs and subsequent ramifications of pushing for the incorporation would be extremely high, as it would greatly expand the level of inquiry the Justice Department would be required to exert in investigating preclearance submissions. This could lead the Court to reinterpret and weaken the Section 2 vote dilution standard in order to lessen the burden 170 UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67:125 244 . But see id. at 1443-44 ("Without incorporation, a jurisdiction could enact changes with a clear discriminatory 'result.' Section 5 could be used only as a shield, with which the Justice Department and the judiciary could block only voting changes that make minority voters worse off. With incorporation, . . . a jurisdiction could not enact a change that is clearly discriminatory, even if minority voters were not worse off under the new plan. Incorporation transforms Section 5 into a sword, enabling the Justice Department and the judiciary to force jurisdictions to make greater strides to eradicate voting discrimination.").
245. placed on the DOJ. The result, of course, would be a weakening of both the "shield" and the "sword" of the VRA.
244
IV. Five Priorities for 2007
The above discussion presents an overview of some of the most salient issues that can be expected to be involved when, and if, Congress considers amending Section 5 in 2007. While the attempt is meant to be as comprehensive as possible, it is still by no means conclusive. Based on the foregoing analysis, there are five priorities that advocates, academics, and observers should focus on in gearing up for the legislative battle over the reauthorization of Section 5.
1. Collect Evidence of Discriminatory Election Policies and Procedures That Will Ensure That Section 5 Will Pass Constitutional Scrutiny.
Concerns about the constitutionality of Section 5 are heightened after the Supreme Court's recent decision in Boerne, and ensuring that the provision is supported with sufficient evidence of discrimination is essential to confirming it will be upheld upon renewal. Thus, at the center of any renewal strategy should be discussions of what sorts of evidence will be most beneficial to the reauthorization, or whether it is worth altering Section 5 to increase the likelihood of its constitutionality.
Various commentators have made suggestions as to what sorts of evidence of continued discrimination in covered areas, and how much, is necessary to justify Congressional reauthorization of Section 5.
245
One commentator has proposed that evidence of racial bloc voting-among other indicators of minority under-representation-could be presented as a proxy for discrimination.
246
Others have stressed the need for a showing of broad patterns of various types of discrimination.
247
Also relevant to consider are legislative strategies to alter Section 5 that would increase the likelihood of its survival to a constitutional challenge. Bernard Grofman, a frequent expert witness in voting rights cases and long
